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Abstract 
We examine whether and under which circumstances World Bank projects and IMF programs 
affect the likelihood of major government crises. Using a sample of more than 90 developing 
countries over the period 1970-2002, we find that crises are on average more likely in the 
presence of Bank and Fund involvement. While the effect of the IMF to some extent depends 
on the model specification, the impact of the World Bank is shown to be robust to the choice 
of control variables and method of estimation. We also find that governments face an 
increasing risk to enter a crisis when they remain under IFI programs when the economy 
performs better. The (economic) conditions present when a new IFI program is initiated, 
however, do not play a major role for crisis probability. Finally, only programs concluded by 
the current government affect crises, while those inherited by preceding governments do not.  
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There is substantial anecdotal evidence that structural adjustment programs by the World 
Bank and, even more so, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) face severe resistance by 
those groups in society fearing to be among the losers of these programs’ consequences.
1 In 
some cases IMF and World Bank involvement led to government crises, cabinet changes, or 
the replacement of entire governments.
2 However, there are also countries in which 
adjustment programs did not end up in major political turmoil (Nelson 1992). 
What are the circumstances under which IMF and World Bank involvement harms the 
governments of the program countries and when is it that the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) do not lead to government crises? While several studies report empirical 
evidence that concluding IMF programs affects survival rates of political leaders (Smith and 
Vreeland 2003) as well as the re-election probability of incumbent governments (Killick 
1995, Dreher 2004), this question has so far not been investigated. Arguably, this is an 
important omission. Answering this question gives guidance to governments on the verge of 
concluding Fund and Bank programs. It might also help the IFIs designing their programs in a 
way so as not to hurt program countries’ governments. To some extent, knowing the 
circumstances leading to government crises also sheds light on the IFIs’ “scapegoat” function 
(Vreeland 1999). Can governments blame the IFIs for unpopular policies and thereby reduce 
the risk of crises? Or do citizens blame their government for the IFIs’ presence and respond 
with riots and demonstrations, leading to government crises?  
We continue as follows. The next section develops our hypotheses. Section 3 presents 
our data and method of estimation. We first examine whether the implementation of IMF and 
World Bank programs on average induces government crises.
3 In a second step, we 
investigate the circumstances which yield negative outcomes and separate those from cases in 
which IMF and World Bank did not hurt the governments. The results are presented in 
Section 4. To anticipate the main results, we find that IMF and World Bank programs 
significantly increase crisis probability. We also find that governments face an increasing risk 
to enter a crisis when they remain under IFI programs when the economy performs better. The 
(economic) conditions present when a new IFI program is initiated, however, do not play a 
major role for crisis probability. Finally, only programs concluded by the current government 
                                                           
1 Among the more prominent examples are the general strikes against the IMF’s austerity policy in Argentina in 
1992 and 1994. 
2 As one example, the Marcos government in the Philippines in 1985 followed the IMF’s austerity policy in spite 
of severe domestic resistance (Montes 1987). Marcos was finally overthrown by the military. See Dreher (2002) 
for further anecdotal evidence. 
3 To the best of our knowledge, the only existing study that also focuses on IFI involvement and political 
instability is Sidell (1988). However, Sidell only presents simple correlations for the IMF.   3
affect crises, while those inherited by preceding governments do not. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. The Hypotheses 
The record of IMF and Bank involvement can not be considered to be fully successful.
4 
Although the transmission channel is still unclear, recent empirical studies universally report 
a negative influence of IMF programs on (short-term) economic growth (e.g., Przeworski and 
Vreeland 2000, Barro and Lee 2005, Atoyan and Conway 2006, Dreher 2006). Furthermore, 
according to Easterly (2005), neither Bank nor Fund significantly reduced macroeconomic 
distortions in program countries. Finally, structural adjustment programs have increased 
inequality (Pastor 1987, Garuda 2000, Vreeland 2002) and did not reduce poverty in program 
countries (Hajro and Joyce 2008). It is, therefore, no surprise that the political costs to 
negotiate IMF and World Bank programs are sometimes substantial. This is clearly 
documented by Vreeland (1999) who finds that governments expect IMF programs – on 
average – to reduce their standing with its citizens.  
Fund and Bank conditionality sometimes substantially interferes with domestic 
politics. Apart from the macroeconomic consequences of the IFIs’ involvement, political 
power constellations are changed. This is likely to be true both within the government and 
with respect to parties among the parliament more generally. Within the government, it is well 
documented that the position of the ministers of finance and economy is strengthened vis-à-
vis the spending ministries (Buira 2002). Both regarding other ministers or government 
parties and the (parliamentary and non-parliamentary) opposition, the IFIs can be used as 
scapegoats for unpopular policies (see Vreeland 1999, Smith and Vreeland 2003). By tying 
their hands to the IMF program, politicians can overcome domestic opposition and, hence, 
reduce the probability of a political crisis. 
Another channel through which the IFIs are likely to affect political crises is the funds 
associated with their programs. It is well documented that IMF and World Bank loans are 
sometimes abused by national governments to secure their power (e.g., Dreher and Vaubel 
2004). Governments can use the funds paid out by the IFIs directly for this purpose. Support 
gained with the help of IFI credit could outweigh the loss of support due to the 
implementation of the program, which will also reduce the likelihood of a government crisis. 
                                                           
4 For recent surveys on the role and operations of the IMF see Joyce (2004), Vreeland (2006), Bird (2007), and 
Steinwand and Stone (2008).   4
Fund and Bank conditionality, on the other hand is frequently accused to follow 
market-oriented policy prescriptions. Even when the majority of government endorses the 
program and is willing to implement the policies, other parts of government might refuse the 
IFIs’ conditionality, giving rise to dissent among the government. Parties of the government 
coalition might threaten to leave the government, inducing a crisis. 
Based on these considerations, the direction of IMF and World Bank involvement on 
the probability of crises is not a priori obvious and we can only measure the net-effect of the 
IFIs’ involvement. We hypothesize: 
  
Hypothesis 1: IMF and World Bank involvement affect the probability of crises 
in the recipient countries. 
 
Arguably, the effect of Fund and Bank involvement on government crises is likely to 
depend on the success of the program and the development of the economy. For our purposes, 
it does not matter whether and to what extent the IFIs caused such development. An increase 
in economic growth, e.g., might be attributed to the IFIs’ programs whether or not these 
programs actually caused growth. However, when the economy performs well, the scapegoat 
function of the IFIs looses its value. The threat of terminating the projects is not as binding for 
opposing views in the government as in harder times. When the economy performs badly, to 
the contrary, the opponents to the current policy stance are more likely to accept the policy 
conditions of the IFIs, reducing the probability of government crises. Overall, while the 
direction of the potential effect is not obvious, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of IMF and World Bank involvement on crisis 
probability depends on how the economy evolves over the course of the 
program. 
The analyses in Dreher (2004) and Smith and Vreeland (2003) suggest that the effect of the 
IFIs involvement is likely to depend on the circumstances under which a program came into 
effect. Under certain circumstances the IFIs’ programs can help citizens to derive the ‘type’ of 
their government. If the economy performs moderately, competent politicians do not have to 
turn to the Fund. They signal their competence by borrowing from the market or other 
countries. Incompetent politicians, to the contrary, have to turn to the IMF, signalling their 
incompetence. Clearly, domestic support is likely to suffer, potentially giving rise to 
government crises. In particular, Dreher shows that governments concluding IMF 
arrangements prior to a national election generally increase their re-election probability. This   5
increased probability of getting re-elected after program conclusions decreases, however, with 
rising GDP growth. The likelihood of losing an election is also higher when other countries in 
the same region experience higher GDP growth. IMF programs might thus imply a signal 
about the incumbent’s quality: When growth rates are low, voters accept the necessity to 
involve the Fund. In a good economic environment, however, only incompetent governments 
need Fund assistance – and consequently lose office in the next election. According to the 
empirical analysis in Smith and Vreeland (2003), government survival positively depends on 
whether the program has been into existence before the current government came into power. 
In this case, citizens do not blame their government for the existence of the program. The 
incumbent government can abuse the IFIs as a scapegoat – consequently, instability 
decreases. We derive two hypotheses from this discussion: 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of IMF and World Bank involvement on crisis 
probability depends on the state of the economy, i.e., economic growth, 
monetary expansion, inflation, current account balance and international 
reserves, at the time the program is initiated. 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of IMF and World Bank involvement on crisis 
probability depends on whether the current government turned to the 
IFIs itself or inherited the program. 
 
3. Method and Data 
The regression is a pooled time-series cross-section analysis (panel data). Our annual data 
cover the years 1970-2002 and extend to more than 90 developing countries.
5 Since some of 
the data are not available for all countries or years, the panel data are unbalanced and the 
number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables.
6 Our dependent 
variable is a dummy taking the value of one in case of at least one major government crisis 
and zero otherwise. This variable is taken from the Databanks International (2005) Cross-
National Time-Series Data Archive. A major government crisis is defined as “any rapidly 
developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime, excluding 
situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow.”
7  
As our explanatory variables of main interest we employ two variables indicating 
Fund and Bank involvement in a country. First, we use a dummy variable that is one if an 
                                                           
5 We omit industrialized countries that never received IMF or World Bank loans. 
6 All variables, their precise definitions, data sources and summary statistics are listed in Appendices A and B. 
7 The judgment whether this criterion is met is usually coded using information from major international 
newspapers such as The New York Times. This is common practice in the coding of political event variables. The 
variable’s definition is adopted from Rummel (1963).   6
IMF program has been in effect for at least five months in a certain year, and zero otherwise 
(taken from Dreher 2006). The dummy includes programs under the Funds’ Structural 
Adjustment Facility and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. Second, we use a similar 
variable for the World Bank, counting the number of loans given for structural adjustment in 
effect for at least five months in a certain year, according to the definition from the World 
Bank’s webpage. While countries can only have one IMF program at the time under the 
facilities covered here, the maximum number of World Bank structural adjustment projects 
among the countries in our sample is seven (Bangladesh in 1989 and Argentina in 1998 and 
1999).  
 To estimate the impact of Bank and Fund involvement on the probability of major 
government crises, we resort to a panel discrete choice regression model. We test for the 
appropriate panel data model using the Hausman test, testing the null-hypothesis that all 
country fixed effects equal zero by comparing the estimates of a conditional fixed effects logit 
model (see Chamberlain 1980) and the unrestricted (pooled) logit model. The null-hypothesis 
of no country specific effects is rejected at conventional levels of significance for all model 
specifications. Hence, conditional fixed effects are used. 
We want to ensure that our findings are not biased by temporal dependence in the 
data. Therefore, we employ Beck et al.’s (1998) remedy to test and correct for temporal 
dependence. Beck et al. (1998) show that panel logit data are identical to grouped duration 
data and suggest dealing with this problem by adding a series of dummy variables to the 
model marking the number of years since the previous occurrence of an “event.” Cubic 
splines, along with a count variable for the number of years since the last major government 
crisis, approximate a Cox regression, which allows for non-parametric estimation of duration 
dependence. The approach is equivalent to including a series of dummy variables that “count” 
the number of non-crisis years. Thus, there is a dummy variable coded one for country-years 
without major crisis for exactly one year and 0 otherwise; another dummy coded one for 
country-years without crises for exactly two years and 0 otherwise, another for three years 
without crisis, etc. Note that with a long time-series like ours, the dummy variable approach 
would entail over 30 additional variables. The splines serve to approximate the same controls 
with fewer variables by essentially grouping similar types of observations. We follow Beck et 
al. (1998), who suggest three splines to be sufficient. The empirical test for the relevance of 
temporal dependence is a F-test on the three cubic splines and the years since the last crisis. 
For our sample the four temporal dependence variables are jointly significant at the one   7
percent level in all estimations. For more details on the method, we refer readers to Beck et al. 
(1998).  
As one potential problem, IMF and World Bank programs might be triggered by the 
same set of underlying factors also triggering a government crisis. When we fail to explicitly 
control for these factors, our results might reflect some common cause interdependency and 
would as such be spurious. In order to address the potential endogeneity problem, we replicate 
the analysis using the dynamic panel GMM approach developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), 
Arellano and Bover (1995), as well as Blundell and Bond (1998). Clearly, assuming a linear 
probability for the existence of an IMF program is no perfect solution. However, as Janvry et 
al. (2006) and Hyslop (1999) argue, such linear probability models are more tractable and 
flexible in the handling of unobserved heterogeneity than linear probability models are. Still, 
in the GMM estimations we use the number of crises per year and country rather than the 
dummies for the occurrence of any crisis as dependent variable. We use the two-step estimator 
implemented by Roodman (2006) in Stata, including Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample 
correction, introducing the lagged dependent variable and dummies for each year.
8 We treat the 
lagged dependent variable and the two IFI variables as endogenous and the additional covariates 
as strictly exogenous. We report results of the Sargan-Hansen test on the validity of the 
instruments used (amounting to a test for the exogeneity of the covariates), and the Arellano-
Bond test of first and second order autocorrelation. While autocorrelation of first order prevails 
by definition, second-order autocorrelation must be absent in order for the estimator to be 
consistent. As a way to minimize the number of instruments in the regressions we collapse the 
matrix of instruments as suggested in Roodman (2006).
9 As a consequence, the number of 
instruments amounts to 122 for our basic setup.  
As preliminary test for the exogeneity of the IFI’s involvement in a country, we also 
follow a second strategy: We compare the (unconditional) probability of a major government 
crisis before and after the first involvement of either IFI. For the World Bank the probability 
of a government crisis is 9.1 percent before the first time the World Bank is first involved and 
14.8 percent afterwards. According to a Chi-squared test this difference is significant at the 1 
percent level. In case of the IMF the probabilities are 10.9 percent before the first involvement 
and 13.3 percent afterwards. The p-value for the corresponding Chi-squared test is 0.055. 
Both non-parametric tests support that causality runs indeed from IFI involvement to an 
                                                           
8 The lagged dependent variable and the time dummies allow at least to some extent to take the temporal 
dependence into account in the GMM estimations. Moreover, Roodman (2006) suggests to include time 
dummies as the inclusion prevents contemporaneous correlation of the error term. 
9 As demonstrated by Bowsher (2002) this is necessary as the power of the Sargan-Hansen test is weak if the 
number of instruments is large.   8
increased probability of a major government crises. The next section presents the estimation 
results. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Using the conditional fixed effects approach with time-dependency we first replicate the 
findings of Gassebner and Jong-A-Pin (2007). Using a general-to-specific approach and 
Extreme Bounds Analysis (see Sala-i-Martin 1997) they examine which variables are robustly 
related to major government crises. These robust variables are: the type of political regime 
and its duration, several variables proxying for political violence (guerilla warfare, 
assassinations and purges) and several variables that proxy for mass civil protest 
(demonstrations, riots and general strikes).
10  
Column 1 of Table 1 shows our base model.
11 The results suggest that major 
government crises are more likely in more democratic political systems. As one explanation, 
parties in such systems can easily express their opinion on controversial policies and events. 
If opinions differ widely, this may ultimately trigger a crisis. In autocratic systems there is 
likely more pressure from above to prevent such chain of events from the beginning.  
The significantly negative coefficient of the regime duration variable reflects that new 
political regimes face more political turmoil than long lasting regimes. This result can be 
explained by the fact that newly established (democratic) regimes do not have much 
experience with political consensus. In newly established regimes there is often a transition 
phase in which new institutions are built. As the stakes are high, partisan political parties will 
not be inclined to give in on issues related to the formation of these institutions, with 
government crisis as ultimate consequence. Furthermore, we find crises to be significantly 
more likely with mass civil protest and political violence, represented by the significant 
coefficients of demonstrations, guerilla warfare, and purges.
12 Finally, the results show that 
economic growth in the previous year reduces the likelihood of a government crisis. In a 
nutshell, prosperous times have an conciliatory effect. 
In turn, we examine whether Fund and Bank involvement does affect the probability 
of a major government crisis. In specifications 2-4, we add our variables of main interest. 
According to the results, the probability of government crises is strongly affected by World 
                                                           
10 Arguably, some of these variables might also be affected by the presence of Fund and Bank. When omitting 
the proxies for political violence and civil protests, however, most of the results reported below remain 
unchanged. 
11 Note that duration dependence is strong in our data. Countries are likely to experience several government 
crises closely after each other. 
12 To minimize the potential influence of extreme observations we use the logarithm of all these count variables 
(and added one to all values to avoid missing observations).   9
Bank programs. At the one percent-level of significance, Bank involvement increases crisis 
probability. The corresponding marginal effect implies that each World Bank structural loan 
received in the previous year increases the probability of a major government crisis by 5.4 
percent.
13 The effect of IMF programs seems to be even bigger. The estimated coefficient is 
significant at the five percent-level, while the corresponding marginal effect suggests that the 
involvement of the IMF in the previous year increases the probability of a major government 
crisis by 14.70 percent. Column 4 shows that these findings prevail when we include the IMF 
and World Bank variables at the same time. The corresponding marginal effects change to a 
probability increase of 4.46 percent for a lagged World Bank project and 11.82 percent for an 
IMF program.
14 
Column 5 reports results employing the GMM estimator. One drawback of this setup 
is that the resulting coefficients can no longer be interpreted as probabilities. Regarding our 
variables of main interest the results show that crises are still more likely with the number of 
World Bank projects, at the five percent-level of significance. The IMF program dummy, 
however, is no longer significant at conventional levels.  
In order to test our second hypothesis, we replicate the analysis including proxies for 
the contemporaneous state of the economy. We thereby assume that people judge the role of 
the IFIs according to recent economic developments. We use the following variables: 
economic growth per capita, consumer price index, monetary expansion, current account 
balance, and foreign reserves in months of imports, all taken from the World Bank’s (2006) 
World Development Indicators. In addition to including the variables itself, we add their 
interaction with the IFIs programs (both lagged by one year). Note, however, that interpreting 
the interaction effect in non-linear models (such as conditional fixed effect Logit) is not 
analogous to linear models. A simple t-test on the coefficient of the interaction term is not 
sufficient to see whether the interaction is significant. As demonstrated by Ai and Norton 
(2003), the interaction effect takes the following form: 
), 2 1 )( 1 ( ) )( ( ) 1 ( 1 12 2 2 12 1 12
2 1
2
F F F x x F F
x x
F
− − + + + − =
∂ ∂
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=  and   being the two variables forming the interaction and the 
interacted variable, respectively. The
12 2 1 , , x x x
β ’s are the corresponding coefficients indexed 
accordingly. If one of the interacted variables is a dummy (as in our case the IMF variable), 
                                                           
13 All marginal effects are estimated at the mean of all explanatory variables and setting the fixed effects to zero. 
14 Note that we also tested for the impact of official development aid (in percent of GDP) and GDP per capita. 
While the resulting coefficients are completely insignificant, our results are not changed by their inclusion.   10
however, we instead have to calculate the discrete difference with respect to the dummy 
variable of the single derivative (with respect to the continuous variable). In contrast to linear 
models, the significance of the interaction term depends on all variables included in the 
model.  
Table 2 shows the GMM estimates, where we include the proxies for the state of the 
economy and their interaction with World Bank projects to the base model of Table 1.
15 As 
the t-statistics of the interaction terms are meaningless in the Logit regressions, we do not 
report the results in the table. Instead we show the graphical representation of the magnitude 
of the interaction effects and their confidence bounds for significant interaction terms.  
According to the results of the Logit estimations, the interaction of World Bank 
projects with most of our proxies is not significant at conventional levels. The exception is 
international reserves. Figure 1a depicts the magnitude of the interaction effect of World Bank 
loans and international reserves. As documented in the equation above, the value of each 
variable for each observation influences the respective interaction effect. We thus calculate 
the effect for each observation in our sample. Additionally we calculate the 90 percent-
confidence interval for each interaction effect. As can be seen in the figure, the interaction 
effect is significant from large share of the observations. We thus conclude that the interaction 
between World Bank loans and international reserves affects the probability of government 
crises. However, we are not interested in the interaction effect as such but in the marginal 
effect of a World Bank project. The marginal effect amounts to 








β β  (2) 
where F and theβ ’s are defined as above and   are World Bank projects. Again, all values 
of all variables influence the marginal effect and this effect is conditional on the level of 
international reserves ( ). We show the result in Figure 1b. As can be seen, for very low 
levels of reserves the effect of the World Bank is not statitically different from zero. 
Accordingly, in bad economic situations World Bank projects do not increase the probability 
of a government crisis. This is likely to reflect the scapegoat function of the Bank. If countries 
need the support of the Bank, unpopular policies can be attributed to the Bank, increasing 
cohesion among the government, and reducing the risk of a crisis. If reserves are above a 
certain threshold (in our case approx. 2.9 months of imports), an additional World Bank 
project increases the probability of a crisis at the ten percent level at least. The largest 
2 x
1 x
                                                           
15 We treat the lagged dependent variable, the IFI variable and the interaction variable of the IFI and the proxy 
for the state of the economy as endogenous.   11
marginal effect is an increase by almost 20 percent, while the average significant effect is 
around 6 percent. Consequently, the scapegoat function seems to loose its value when 
reserves are sufficiently high and World Bank support is less desperately needed.  
Note, that the GMM results shown in column 5 of Table 2 support this interpretation. 
At the ten percent level of significance, World Bank projects increase the risk of a crisis when 
reserves are high, while international reserves as such decrease the probability of a crisis at 
the five percent level of significance. To calculate the marginal effect of an additional project, 
we again have to take account of both the conditioning variable (international reserves) and 
the interaction term. This is not only true for the magnitude of the effect but also for the 
significance level (see Friedrich, 1982). We therefore show the total marginal effect 
conditional on reserves graphically. On the y-axis we show the marginal effect of an 
additional World Bank project and on the x-axis the level of reserves at which the marginal 
effect is evaluated. Moreover, we include the 90 percent-confidence interval in the graph. As 
can be seen in Figure 2a, in line with our results of the conditional fixed effects setup an 
additional World Bank project increases the probability of a crisis (at the ten percent level at 
least) if international reserves are greater than 2.9 months of imports. In the GMM setup the 
magnitude of this effect is much larger which is due to the fact that it does not represent a 
probability.  
The GMM estimates of Table 2 show that the result for international reserves does 
hold for the current account balance also. At the one percent level of significance, the 
interaction of World Bank projects and the current account balance increases the probability 
of government crises, while the current account balance itself is not significant at 
conventional levels. We show the marginal effect of an additional World Bank project 
conditional on the current account balance in Figure 2b. While the interaction term is 
statistically highly significant the coefficient is so small that the marginal effect is virtually 
constant. 
Table 3 replicates the analysis for the IMF. Note that all interaction terms are not 
significant at conventional levels of significance according to the Logit estimates. As can be 
seen in column 3 of Table 3, however, the interaction of inflation and IMF programs is 
significant at the ten percent level in the GMM setup, with a negative coefficient (while 
inflation itself is not significant at conventional levels). Figure 3 reports the corresponding 
marginal effect of IMF programs conditional on the rate of inflation. The result supports our 
hypothesis that the scapegoat function of the IMF is more valuable at rough times. With rising 
inflation, government crises are less likely to arise as a consequence of IMF programs.    12
In summary, there is some evidence in favour of Hypothesis 2. The state of the economy 
does matter for the effect of the IFIs programs. However, rather than being able to profit from 
potentially successful programs, governments face an increasing risk to enter a crisis when they 
remain under an IFI program when the economy performs better. 
Tables 4 and 5 add our proxies for the state of the economy in the year a new program 
is initiated. Table 4 reports the GMM results for the World Bank. As can be seen, the 
conclusion of a World Bank program as such does not induce a government crisis. More 
importantly, the conditions when a new program is started also do not seem to matter. The 
same is true in the conditional fixed effects setup. All interaction terms are not statistically 
different from zero. We thus suppress the graphical output.  
Table 5 replicates the analysis for the IMF. The results mirror those obtained for the 
World Bank. Hence, there is no emprical support for Hypothesis 3. The (economic) 
conditions which are present when a new IFI program is initiated do not seem to play a major 
role. 
Finally, we investigate whether and to what extent governments can blame their 
predecessors for the IFIs’ involvement, thereby avoiding the increasing risk of crises as a 
consequence of this involvement (Hypothesis 4). We therefore separate our IFI variables in 
two groups of programs. The first group of programs has been negotiated by the preceding 
government, so that the current government can not be blamed for their existence. The second 
group contains programs that the government itself agreed to, and is thus responsible for. 
The results of Table 6 support our hypothesis. Only programs concluded by the current 
government affect crisis probability. This is true for World Bank projects according to all 
specifications, at least at the five percent level of significance, and for IMF programs 
according to the Logit estimates when the World Bank variables are excluded. IMF and 
World Bank programs negotiated by preceding governments do not affect crisis probability in 
any specification. The corresponding meginal effect (again evaluated at the mean of all 
explanatory variables and the fixed effects set to zero) are 8.44 percent and 7.55 percent for 
the World Bank and 17.03 percent for the IMF. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we examined whether and under which circumstances IMF and World Bank 
projects induce major government crises in borrowing countries. In addition to testing 
whether the IFIs’ involvement per se affects crisis probability, we also investigated how the 
effect of the IFIs depends on the current economic situation in the borrowing country.   13
Moreover, we argued that the economic situation at the time the project is concluded affects 
crisis probability. Finally, we hypothesize that projects should be less harmful to the 
government when inherited from preceding governments. 
According to our results, structural adjustment projects significantly increase crisis 
probability. For the Bank, this central finding persists after a wide array of robustness tests, 
while the impact of the IMF is not entirely robust to the method of estimation. We also find 
that governments face an increasing risk to enter a crisis when they remain under IFI 
programs when the economy performs better. The (economic) conditions present when a new 
IFI program is initiated, however, do not play a major role for crisis probability. Finally, only 
programs concluded by the current government affect crises, while those inherited by 
preceding governments do not. 
Our results bear important policy implications. Arguably, while countries do on 
average increase the risk of entering a crisis after turning to the IMF and the World Bank, the 
extent of the crisis depends on how the economy evolves over the IFIs’ involvement. This 
insight might help governments choosing the right time to exit their programs.    14
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Table 1: Hypothesis 1 – Government Crisis and IFI involvement 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy 0.045 0.047 0.048 0.043 0.002
(3.10)*** (3.02)*** (3.14)*** (2.76)*** (1.50)
Regime duration -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 0.001
(1.88)* (1.52) (1.47) (1.59) (0.94)
Riots (log) 0.224 0.152 0.141 0.143 0.057
(1.58) (1.01) (0.95) (0.96) (1.48)
Demonstrations (log) 0.791 0.817 0.819 0.814 0.139
(6.08)*** (5.97)*** (5.99)*** (5.94)*** (4.52)***
Strikes (log) 0.320 0.367 0.377 0.364 0.134
(1.64) (1.80)* (1.85)* (1.79)* (2.28)**
Guerilla warfare (log) 0.914 0.444 0.422 0.434 0.079
(4.22)*** (1.71)* (1.63) (1.68)* (1.68)*
Assassinations (log) 0.248 0.379 0.365 0.363 0.079
(1.61) (2.35)** (2.25)** (2.24)** (2.13)**
Purges (log) 1.120 1.344 1.336 1.361 0.234
(4.44)*** (5.11)*** (5.10)*** (5.17)*** (2.85)***
Growth per capita (t-1) -0.028 -0.035 -0.037 -0.038 -0.002
(2.76)*** (3.28)*** (3.40)*** (3.52)*** (2.31)**
Number of World Bank projects (t-1) 0.220 0.181 0.029
(2.62)*** (2.10)** (2.05)**
IMF programs, dummy (t-1) 0.592 0.475 0.001
(2.50)** (1.95)* (0.02)
Major government crises (t-1) 0.124
(3.22)***
Method Logit Logit Logit Logit GMM
Observations 2534 2406 2406 2406 3254
Number of country 94 92 92 92 132
Number of Instruments 122
AR1 Test (p-value) 0.00
AR2 Test (p-value) 0.49
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.31  
 
Notes: Columns (1)-(4) show the results of conditional fixed effects Logit regressions controlling for temporal 
dependence. The dependent variable is 1 if there was at least one major government crisis in a given country and 
year. Column (5) represents the result of dynamic panel GMM estimation including time fixed effects. The 
dependent variable in column (5) is the number of major government crises in a given country and year. 
The absolute value of the z statistics is given in parenthesis.  */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1- 
percent significance level. 
 Table 2: Hypothesis 2 – Government Crisis, World Bank, and current state of economy 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.012
(1.71)* (1.82)* (1.84)* (1.86)* (1.78)*
Regime duration 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.005
(0.17) (1.38) (0.83) (0.40) (1.54)
Riots (log) 0.049 0.059 0.038 0.043 0.050
(1.50) (1.55) (0.97) (1.21) (1.29)
Demonstrations (log) 0.129 0.137 0.142 0.138 0.149
(4.52)*** (5.31)*** (4.66)*** (4.61)*** (4.41)***
Strikes (log) 0.134 0.120 0.154 0.139 0.115
(2.47)** (2.32)** (2.91)*** (2.48)** (2.00)**
Guerilla warfare (log) 0.072 0.061 0.069 0.086 0.068
(1.33) (1.13) (1.24) (1.60) (0.90)
Assassinations (log) 0.081 0.038 0.070 0.060 0.053
(2.14)** (0.85) (1.75)* (1.53) (1.40)
Purges (log) 0.202 0.198 0.207 0.176 0.178
(2.46)** (1.79)* (1.97)* (1.99)** (1.78)*
Growth per capita (t-1) -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 0.001
(1.47) (1.04) (1.93)* (2.04)** (0.24)
Number of World Bank projects (t-1) 0.028 0.060 0.040 0.036 -0.066
(2.02)** (2.86)*** (1.77)* (1.45) (1.08)
WB projects (t-1) • growth p.c. (t-1) -0.003
(0.84)
Current account balance (% of GDP), (t-1) -0.747
(0.62)




WB projects (t-1) · inflation (t-1) -2.35E-06
(0.03)
Monetary expansion (t-1) -1.94E-04
(1.09)
WB projects (t-1) · monetary expansion (t-1) 1.07E-04
(0.79)
International reserves (in months of imports), (t-1) -0.140
(2.22)**
WB projects (t-1) · reserves (t-1) 0.033
(1.79)*
Major government crises (t-1) 0.126 0.149 0.139 0.119 0.146
(3.08)*** (2.69)*** (3.27)*** (2.86)*** (2.67)***
Constant 0.077 0.019 0.066 0.084 0.563
(2.27)** (0.41) (1.91)* (2.24)** (2.10)**
 GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Observations 3254 2504 2709 3027 2433
Number of group(wdi) 132 124 120 127 125
Number of Instruments 136.00 135.00 136.00 136.00 135.00
AR1 Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR2 Test (p-value) 0.49 0.38 0.70 0.62 0.23
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.66 0.74 0.89 0.30 0.64  
 
Notes: Shows the results of dynamic panel GMM estimations including time fixed effects, where the dependent 
variable is the number of major government crises in a given country and year. 
The absolute value of the z statistics is given in parenthesis.  */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1- 
percent significance level. 
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Table 3: Hypothesis 2 – Government Crisis, IMF, and current state of economy  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.006
(1.13) (1.44) (1.36) (1.49) (1.50)
Regime duration -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.002
(0.15) (0.28) (0.23) (0.17) (0.81)
Riots (log) 0.050 0.057 0.046 0.040 0.061
(1.54) (1.53) (1.15) (1.15) (1.57)
Demonstrations (log) 0.101 0.129 0.122 0.113 0.118
(3.83)*** (3.94)*** (3.98)*** (3.56)*** (3.55)***
Strikes (log) 0.170 0.133 0.148 0.165 0.128
(3.67)*** (2.42)** (2.91)*** (3.22)*** (2.26)**
Guerilla warfare (log) 0.019 0.044 0.026 0.033 0.035
(0.39) (0.77) (0.49) (0.59) (0.60)
Assassinations (log) 0.114 0.059 0.107 0.102 0.061
(3.83)*** (1.43) (2.68)*** (2.69)*** (1.56)
Purges (log) 0.221 0.205 0.163 0.160 0.128
(3.43)*** (2.17)** (1.90)* (1.99)** (1.20)
Growth per capita (t-1) -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001
(2.76)*** (1.08) (2.75)*** (3.04)*** (0.49)
IMF programs, dummy (t-1) 0.008 0.023 0.022 0.000 -0.039
(0.28) (0.60) (0.76) (0.01) (0.34)
 IMF dummy (t-1) · growth p.c. (t-1) -0.005
(1.24)
Current account balance (% of GDP, t-1) -0.454
(0.52)




IMF dummy (t-1) · inflation (t-1) -0.001
(1.98)*
Monetary expansion (t-1) -2.19E-04
(1.05)
IMF dummy (t-1) · monetary expansion (t-1) -1.97E-04
(0.47)
International reserves (in months of imports, t-1) -0.040
(0.71)
IMF dummy (t-1) · reserves (t-1) 0.021
(0.55)
Major government crises (t-1) 0.112 0.133 0.140 0.117 0.152
(3.26)*** (2.16)** (3.20)*** (2.99)*** (2.73)***
Constant 0.087 0.082 0.075 0.086 0.210
(3.55)*** (1.63) (1.87)* (2.36)** (1.11)
Method GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Observations 3254 2504 2709 3027 2433
Number of group(wdi) 132 124 120 127 125
Number of Instruments 103 103 103 103 103
AR1 Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR2 Test (p-value) 0.53 0.36 0.74 0.56 0.25
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.89 0.43 0.71 0.57 0.48  
 
Notes: Shows the results of dynamic panel GMM estimations including time fixed effects, where the dependent 
variable is the number of major government crises in a given country and year. 
The absolute value of the z statistics is given in parenthesis.  */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1- 
percent significance level.   20
Table 4: Hypothesis 3 – Government Crisis, state of economy at new World Bank loan  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.007
(2.06)** (1.93)* (2.08)** (1.75)* (1.56)
Regime duration 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.36) (0.15) (0.19) (0.65) (0.77)
Riots (log) 0.040 0.034 0.039 0.030 0.024
(1.32) (0.90) (0.98) (0.84) (0.63)
Demonstrations (log) 0.147 0.135 0.139 0.142 0.135
(5.38)*** (4.84)*** (4.40)*** (4.50)*** (4.28)***
Strikes (log) 0.114 0.153 0.160 0.112 0.134
(2.36)** (2.80)*** (3.19)*** (2.10)** (3.08)***
Guerilla warfare (log) 0.069 0.045 0.070 0.065 0.060
(1.40) (0.83) (1.49) (1.25) (1.04)
Assassinations (log) 0.081 0.057 0.055 0.061 0.054
(1.96)* (1.36) (1.44) (1.43) (1.37)
Purges (log) 0.221 0.168 0.162 0.311 0.301
(2.75)*** (1.87)* (1.45) (2.89)*** (2.46)**
Growth per capita -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007
(4.01)*** (4.33)*** (3.61)*** (2.42)** (3.45)***
New of World Bank projects -0.026 -0.037 -0.003 0.012 -0.014
(0.95) (0.48) (0.04) (0.16) (0.11)
New WB projects · growth p.c.  -0.002
(0.62)
Current account balance (% of GDP) -9.1E-05
(1.14)








New WB projects · monetary expansion 0.153
(0.37)
International reserves (in months of imports) -0.060
(1.43)
New WB projects · reserves  -0.009
(0.31)
Major government crises (t-1) 0.119 0.156 0.143 0.152 0.151
(3.11)*** (3.52)*** (3.24)*** (2.67)*** (3.08)***
Constant 0.103 0.107 0.122 0.075 0.343
(2.54)** (1.90)* (2.48)** (1.35) (1.78)*
Method GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Observations 3279 2764 3077 2594 2526
Number of group(wdi) 133 121 128 125 126
Number of Instruments 138 137 137 136 136
AR1 Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR2 Test (p-value) 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.77 0.83
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.37 0.76 0.29 0.50 0.87  
Notes: Shows the results of dynamic panel GMM estimations including time fixed effects, where the dependent 
variable is the number of major government crises in a given country and year. 
The absolute value of the z statistics is given in parenthesis.  */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1- 
percent significance level.   21
Table 5: Hypothesis 3 – Government Crisis, state of economy at new IMF program 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003
(1.94)* (2.05)** (1.70)* (1.34) (1.64)
Regime duration 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.00) (0.42) (0.40) (0.22) (0.03)
Riots (log) 0.024 0.026 0.028 0.008 0.018
(0.79) (0.84) (0.84) (0.25) (0.56)
Demonstrations (log) 0.124 0.123 0.115 0.117 0.131
(4.73)*** (4.81)*** (4.08)*** (4.15)*** (4.88)***
Strikes (log) 0.126 0.143 0.139 0.124 0.131
(2.79)*** (2.65)*** (2.67)*** (2.49)** (2.54)**
Guerilla warfare (log) 0.056 0.050 0.052 0.030 0.035
(1.11) (0.75) (0.90) (0.52) (0.72)
Assassinations (log) 0.102 0.084 0.097 0.062 0.068
(2.98)*** (2.50)** (2.94)*** (1.69)* (2.02)**
Purges (log) 0.164 0.127 0.125 0.315 0.247
(2.59)** (1.60) (1.77)* (2.78)*** (2.54)**
Growth per capita -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(4.05)*** (3.52)*** (3.06)*** (2.61)** (3.61)***
New IMF programs, dummy -0.031 -0.021 -0.069 0.037 -0.293
(1.31) (0.24) (1.32) (0.14) (1.54)
New IMF dummy · growth p.c.  0.004
(0.96)
Current account balance (% of GDP) -0.0000577
(0.67)




New IMF dummy  · inflation  0.000138
(0.73)
Monetary expansion  -0.023
(0.70)
New IMF dummy  · monetary expansion  -0.022
(0.33)
International reserves (in months of imports) -0.208
(0.42)
New IMF dummy  · reserves  -1.715
(1.40)
Major government crises (t-1) 0.122 0.127 0.130 0.133 0.141
(3.67)*** (2.50)** (2.92)*** (2.52)** (2.65)***
Constant 0.086 0.096 0.098 0.195 0.102
(2.56)** (1.72)* (3.03)*** (1.39) (2.01)**
Method GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Observations 3279 2764 3077 2526 2594
Number of group(wdi) 133 121 128 126 125
Number of Instruments 107 106 106 106 106
AR1 Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR2 Test (p-value) 0.50 0.77 0.67 0.86 0.72
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.76 0.95 0.76 0.59 0.77  
Notes: Shows the results of dynamic panel GMM estimations including time fixed effects, where the dependent 
variable is the number of major government crises in a given country and year. 
The absolute value of the z statistics is given in parenthesis.  */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1- 
percent significance level.   22
Table 6: Hypothesis 4 – Government Crisis and inherited IFIs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy 0.050 0.049 0.046 0.002 0.002
(3.19)*** (3.17)*** (2.90)*** (1.40) (1.61)
Regime duration -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 0.000 0.000
(1.54) (1.48) (1.58) (0.20) (0.13)
Riots (log) 0.157 0.077 0.113 0.070 0.029
(1.02) (0.50) (0.73) (1.98)* (0.93)
Demonstrations (log) 0.819 0.844 0.835 0.136 0.120
(5.89)*** (6.10)*** (5.97)*** (3.88)*** (4.23)***
Strikes (log) 0.432 0.394 0.429 0.118 0.156
(2.09)** (1.92)* (2.07)** (2.00)** (3.34)***
Guerilla warfare (log) 0.398 0.349 0.341 0.056 0.037
(1.51) (1.33) (1.28) (1.10) (0.73)
Assassinations (log) 0.352 0.379 0.359 0.085 0.112
(2.16)** (2.32)** (2.19)** (2.04)** (3.35)***
Purges (log) 1.353 1.365 1.377 0.193 0.233
(5.06)*** (5.16)*** (5.12)*** (2.34)** (3.57)***
Growth per capita (t-1) -0.040 -0.039 -0.043 -0.002 -0.003
(3.60)*** (3.53)*** (3.80)*** (1.90)* (3.40)***
Number of World Bank projects (t-1), current government 0.344 0.306 0.048
(3.62)*** (3.12)*** (2.55)**
Number of World Bank projects (t-1), previous government -0.014 0.005 0.108
(0.09) (0.03) (1.32)
IMF programs, dummy (t-1), current government 0.688 0.425 0.016
(2.45)** (1.45) (0.43)
IMF programs, dummy (t-1), previous government -0.081 -0.121 0.012
(0.19) (0.29) (0.09)




Method Logit Logit Logit GMM GMM
Observations 2314 2355 2289 3127 3215
Number of country 91 90 90 132 132
Number of Instruments 103 88
AR1 Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00
AR2 Test (p-value) 0.94 0.48
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.79 0.68  
 
Notes: “Logit” show the results of conditional fixed effects Logit regressions accounting for temporal 
dependence. The dependent variable is 1 if there was at least one major government crisis in a given country and 
year. “GMM” represents the results of dynamic panel GMM estimations including time fixed effects, where the 
dependent variable is the number of major government crises in a given country and year. 
The absolute value of the z statistics is given in parenthesis.  */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1- 
percent significance level. 
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Figure 1: Hypothesis 2 – Government Crisis, World Bank, and current state of economy  
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Notes: The figure depicts the marginal effect of the interaction term between the World Bank loans and the 
international reserves for the conditional fixed effects Logit regression. Each dot represents the marginal effect 
for one observation. Also shown is the 90 percent-confidence interval for each marginal effect. Country fixed 
effects are set to zero. 
 











0 5 10 15
l.reserves_i
 
Notes: The figure depicts the marginal effect of World Bank loans conditional on international reserves for the 
conditional fixed effects Logit regression. Each dot represents the marginal effect for one observation. Also 
shown is the 90 percent-confidence interval for each marginal effect. Country fixed effects are set to zero.   24
Figure 2: Hypothesis 2 – Government Crisis, World Bank, and current state of economy  
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Notes: The figure depicts the marginal effect of World Bank loans conditional on lagged international reserves 
for the GMM estimations. Each dot represents the marginal effect for one observation. Also shown is the 90 
percent-confidence interval for each marginal effect. 
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Notes: The figure depicts the marginal effect of World Bank loans conditional on lagged current account balance 
for the GMM estimations. Each dot represents the marginal effect for one observation. Also shown is the 90 
percent-confidence interval for each marginal effect. 
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Notes: The figure depicts the marginal effect of the IMF dummy conditional on lagged inflation for the GMM 
estimations. Each dot represents the marginal effect for one observation. Also shown is the 90 percent-
confidence interval for each marginal effect.   26
Appendix A. List of variables, definitions and sources  
 




Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the 
downfall of the present regime, excluding situations of revolt 




IMF programs  Dummy variable that is one if an IMF program has been in 
effect for at least five months in a certain year, and zero 
otherwise. Includes programs under the Structural Adjustment 





Variable counting the number of World Bank projects in effect 
for at least five months in a certain year. Includes projects 
given for structural adjustment, according to the definition from 
the World Bank’s webpage. 
www.world 
bank.org 
Democracy  Polity2 score, represents the difference between a countries 
democracy and autocracy score. Ranges from -10 to 10 with 




Regime duration  The number of years that a political regime is in place.  Marshall and 
Jaggers 
(2002) 
Riots  Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens 




Demonstrations  Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the 
primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to 
government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of 




Strikes  Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that 
involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national 




Guerilla warfare  Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by 
independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at 




Assassinations  Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a 




Purges  Number of systematic repressions (or eliminations) by jailing 
or execution of political opposition within the rank of the 





per capita  
real GDP growth per capita in constant (2000) US$  World Bank 
(2006) 




International reserves in month of imports  World Bank 
(2006) 
Money growth  Money and quasi money growth (annual percent)  World Bank 
(2006) 
Current account 
balance (percent of 
GDP) 
(Current account balance, Balance of Payments in current US$) 
/ (GDP in current US $) 
World Bank 
(2006) 
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Appendix B: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Major government crises  5861  0.16  0.50  0  7 
Crisis dummy  5861  0.12  0.32  0  1 
World Bank projects  5565  0.29  0.73  0  7 
IMF program dummy  5565  0.10  0.30  0  1 
Democracy  5017 0.05  7.56  -10  10 
Regime duration  4897 22.06 28.00  0  193 
Riots (log)  5861 0.15  0.43  0  3.89 
Demonstrations (log)  5861 0.22  0.51  0  3.64 
Strikes (log)  5861 0.08  0.26  0  2.64 
Guerilla warfare (log)  5861 0.11  0.29  0  3.56 
Assassinations (log)  5861 0.09  0.33  0  3.26 
Purges (log)  5861 0.04  0.20  0  3.56 
Economic growth per capita   5680 1.68  6.34 -50.49  89.83 
Inflation  3542 56.77 562.24  -21.67  23773 
International reserves  3365 3.47  3.05  -0.09  27.08 
Money growth  3918 46.83 339.62  -81.70  12513 
Current account balance (percent 
of GDP)  3299  -0.05 0.11 -2.40  0.56 
 
 
 